Plaso 20190131 released

By Anonymous
Plaso 20190131 released
The Plaso team is pleased to announce a new Plaso release, 20190131. Most of the changes in this release are under-the-hood improvements.

Preset changes

One user-facing change is that the parser-preset system has changed to use a YAML configuration format. This makes it a bit easier for users to generate and maintain custom sets of parsers they want to apply.

If you want to use your own presets, use the data_location argument to log2timeline or psteal to specify a directory containing a presets.yaml file. For an example of file format, see the defaults presets we ship.

Distribution changes

As mentioned in our last release announcement, we’re no longer providing builds for Ubuntu Trusty (14.04).

As part of the changes to support Python 3, we’ve removed Hachoir from Plaso. We’re going to continue looking at what to do with Hachoir, possibly replacing some if its parsing functionality directly in Plaso, or using the newer, Python 3 only version of Hachoir once we’ve removed support for Python 2. However Hachoir’s GPL license makes this challenging (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/License_compatibility for more context).

l2tpreg, one of projects spun out of the Plaso core has been archived, and the log2timeline team won’t be making further changes to it.

Other changes

As usual, there’s a bunch of cleanups, performance tweaks and bug fixes, the full list of which are available in the release milestone.


Where/how to get Plaso 20190131?
See Plaso's Users' Guide. As usual, builds are available for Docker, MacOS, Ubuntu, Fedora Core and Windows.

If you run into problems take a look at the Installation Problems page in the Plaso documentation, to see if other people have seen the issue before. If nothing there helps, ask for help on the discuss mailing list: log2timeline-discuss@googlegroups.com  or open an issue on the tracker.

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